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IS THERE A WORLD CYCLE?
INTRODUCTION
In1959 Oskar Morgenstern examined how business cycles spread
from country to country, concentrating his attention on the role
of financial markets in major industrialized economies (the United
States, Great Britain, Germany, and France), during the gold-stan-
dard era of 1870-1949 and the interwar period, 1925- 38.1 These
countries and periods had been the basis of previous NBER studies.
Later, in the course of an analysis of foreign trade, Mintz devel-
oped the concept of a "world cycle" and attempted to quantify it.
Her research included consideration of diffusion indexes of business
cycles (three countries, 1879—1938; fifteen countries, 1890-1931);
diffusion indexes of imports (thirty-four to forty-one countries,
1947- 53; twenty countries, 1954-61); and indexes of world imports
(1880-1965) and of world manufacturing production (1879_1938).2
From these data she developed a chronology of world import cycles
from 1881 to 1959 and applied it to the analysis of U.S. and British
exports and trade balances (see also Chapter 8).
Arthur B. Laffer summarized the results of a number of efforts to
derive a world cycle chronology or to measure the correlation among
fluctuations in different countries. These efforts included an annual
chronology (1890-193 2) devised by Moses Abramovitz (who based
his work on Willard Thorp's Business Annals for eighteen countries),
which was updated by Laffer to 1949-1960. He also reviewed studies
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ofthe intercountry correlation of unemployment rates, stock prices,
interest rates, andwholesaleprices.3 To varying degrees, these re-
searchers discovered evidence of synchronized economic movements
among developed countries. More recently, Bert Hickman and Stefan
Schleicher found evidence of the synchronization of growth rates in
industrial production and real GNP in sixteen countries, but observed
less synchronization in rates of change in consumer prices, wage
rates, or the monetary base.4
At this point, the line of reasoning taken by W. C. Mitchell in
1927 to explain the tendency toward international synchronism
should be recalled:
The basis of this trend toward unity of economic fortunes among commu-
nities organized on the European model is that each phase in a business
cycle, as it develops in any area, tends to produce the same phase in all the
areas with which the first has dealings. Prosperity in one country stimu-
lates demand for the products of other countries, and so quickens the
activities in the latter regions.... Further, prosperity, with its sanguine
temper and its liberal profits, encourages investments abroad as well as at
home, and the export of capital to other countries gives an impetus to
their trade. A recession checks all these stimuli. A severe crisis in any
important center produces quicker and graver results. Demands for finan-
cial assistance raise interest rates and reduce domestic lending power in
other centers; apprehensions regarding the solvency of international houses
may start demands for liquidation in many places; the losses which bank-
ruptcies bring are likely to be felt by business enterprises the world over.5
Mitchell's comments, which suggested that instability would tend
toward international synchronism, raises significant questions. To
what extent have the major industrial market-oriented economies, in
fact, moved in synchronous cycle phases during the postwar period?
Can one locate a country (or countries) from which prosperity
spread to other countries? If so, is it customarily the same country?
Whether or not the expansions and contractions are stimulated by
changes originating in one country, do these fluctuations spread rap-
idly enough to other countries to give the appearance of synchronous
movements, or do they spread more slowly and possibly with differ-
ential lags so that the synchronous movement Mitchell hypothesized
fails to materialize?
Most of the earlier work on these questions, by Mitchell, Morgen-
stern, Mintz, and others, tested whether or not one could establish
evidence of international classical cycles. Morgenstern, for example,
focused on Britain, France, Germany, and the United States and con-
cluded that the four were in the same phase (classical expansion or
contraction) about half the time during 1879_1932.6 For the post-Is There a World Cycle? 287
warperiod we shall search for evidence of synchronous periods or




Inattempting to develop an index that represents fluctuations in the
market-oriented world, we have experimented with a number of
possibilities. An obvious measure, from the vantage point taken in
this book, would be the composite index we have developed for ten
industrialized countries. The primary drawback to such an index is
that, as the reader can appreciate, some countries have provided data
for a far shorter period of time than the thirty- plus years covered by
the economic record for the major countries.
Accordingly, we have settled on a seven-country composite index,
combining the roughly coincident indexes for the United States, Can-
ada, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany, and Japan.
These countries represent more than half of the noncommunist
world's trade, and their combined GNP is a considerable portion of
the total GNP of the market-oriented world as well.
A chronology based upon the trend-adjusted, coincident index for
these seven countries is presented in Figure 6—1 and Table 6—1. It
is useful to compare the seven-country index to chronologies com-
prised of a selection of these countries. The six-country index, for
example, may be used to examine how growth recessions in the
United States are reflected in other countries. The four-country
index enables us to consider the relations between European and
non-European nations. In addition to these indexes we shall use data
prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis on the growth
rates in eight industrial economies, which revealed four international
growth recessions in the period The peaks occurred in
1955, 1960, 1964, 1969, and 1973; the troughs in 1958, 1961,
1967, and 1971. The chronology represents years in which there is
an international consensus of high growth rates or low growth rates
in real GNP, industrial production, imports, and exports.8
This chronology has the obvious disadvantage of being based on
annual data. One would expect peak growth rates to precede the
4 peaksin trend-adjusted indexes, since the indexes do not reach their
peaks until the growth rate has fallen below the trend rate. Barring a
sudden, sharp drop the growth rate begins to decline before that.
Similarly, the troughs in the growth rate may precede the troughs in
trend-adjusted indexes, since the trough in the indexes is not reached
.L ,Part A. Seven-Country Indexes (United States, Canada, United Kingdom,
West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan)
until the growth rate has risen above the trend rate. Table 6—i bears
out these expectations, despite the differences in the countries cov-
ered and in the economic data employed. The monthly composite
index of all the roughly coincident indicators for the seven countries
shows clear cyclical movements, corresponding to similar movements
in the annual data for the eight countries in the Federal Reserve
report.
We turn now to how the international chronology, based on the
seven-country composite index, differs from the individual chronolo-
gies of each country. The seven-country index produces a chronology
of cycles that matches on a one-to-one basis those in the United
States, Belgium (despite its brief length), and Sweden. Three coun-
tries reflect the index on a one-to-one basis except for the absence of
a recession in 1960-61 in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and
France. Canada reflects the international index perfectly except for
an extra cycle in 1976-77, a cycle one finds in the Netherlands as
well (the latter also skips the 1960—61 recession). The Japanese
chronology is similar to the seven-country chronology, but its 1964-
66 recession does not match the 1966-67 recession in the other
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Figure 6-1.International Composite Indexes, by Timing.






















Part B. Six.Country Indexes (Canada, United Kingdom,
West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan)
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Part C. Four.Country Indexes (United Kingdom,
West Germany, France, and Italy)





VerticaJ P and T lines based on coincident index, seven countries.290 Applying the Indicator System
























































a. Chronologies are based on composite indexes of trend-adjusted, roughly coin-
cident indicators. The seven-country index includes the United States, Canada,
West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan; the six-country
index excludes the United States. The four-country index includes the United
Kingdom, West Germany, France, and Italy.
countries. Italy is the most divergent, skipping the 1960-61, 1962-
63, and 1966-67 recessions and exhibiting extra recessions in 1963-
65 and 1976-77.
Despite its limited geographic range, we believe that the seven-
country, composite coincident index provides the best currently
available chronology of world growth cycles. We will make further




Itis, of course, possible to consider the behavior of a number of dif-
ferent kinds of economic activity, withm individual economies or
among several economies via trade and financial flows, during inter-
national recessions and the intervening expansions. Such analyses
permit detection of systematic differences in the operation of eco-
nomic variables with respect to these presumed international cycle
phases. It should be underscored, however, that here, as with indica-Is There a World Cycle? 291
Table 6—2.Consilience of Cycle Phases in Ten Market-Oriented Economies
with Cycle Phases in the International Chronology.
In Phase Out of Phase
Country Number of Months PercentNumber of Months Percent
United States 202 77 60 23
Canada 254 86 42 14
United Kingdom 194 78 53 22
West Germany 178 71 72 29
France 200 83 40 17







Sweden 78 48 83 52
Japan 235 86 38 14
All Countries 1,844 75 615 25
Time Periods Covered: Number of Months


























Sweden 161 Feb. 1965—July1978
Japan 273 May 1957—Feb.1980
a. Includes seven countries. See Table 6—1.
Source: Figure 6—1.
tors of cyclical changes, accurate analysis depends on the selection of
valid turning points. In any attempt to date an international growth
cycle the customary difficulties are compounded. Nevertheless, our
international cycle is a fairly general one in the sense that nearly
every turn in the international cycle is matched by a turn in each of
the countries. In addition, very few countries exhibit extra cycles,
or do so infrequently.
This finding suggests that Mitchell was essentially correct in 1927
when he pointed out the trend "toward unity of economic fortunes."
Table 6—2 illustrates in somewhat simplified form, the degree of
consilience between the ten countries in our sample and the interna-
tional composite index. In general, the degree of consilience for all
these countries over the available period is remarkably high. In only
one country, Sweden, were cycles out of phase as much as half the
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growthcycles resembles the prewar experience with classical cycles
quite closely.
Another point, though, can be raised concerning the validity of a
world growth cycle. Our attention has so far focused on whether
growth swings are widespread and synchronous among industrial
countries. If that tendency were weak, as it no doubt is in the case of
crop yields per acre in different countries, we should not be inclined
to say there is a world cycle at all, even though there might be fluc-
tuations. On the other hand, we might still legitimately ask whether
these general movements are in the nature of random fluctuations
over the years. Growth rates might be synchronous across countries
but random through time. In the case of crop yields, which are
strongly influenced by vagaries in the weather, the movements
through time are virtually random.9 A 1974 study of annual growth
rates in sixteen countries during 1950 -69, applied to GNP, exports,
imports, and output of agriculture, manufacturing, and construction,
found that "fluctuations are in most cases not statisticaily distin-
guishable from those generated by a random The length
of runs up or down in the rates of growth was tested for each fluctu-
ation. In a random series of such rates, runs of one year are expected
to be most frequent, two-year runs less frequent, and so on (see the
first reference cited in Note 9). The authors noted that similar tests
applied to quarterly or monthly data might yield a different result,
but this would not necessarily reduce the significance of the fact
that, when aggregated into annual time units, growth rates in many
economic series in many countries have the characteristics of random
series over time." They remain, however, related from one country
to another as we have shown.
We turn now to the question of whether or not many cyclical epi-
sodes are triggered by the same country. We should like to examine
this question at some future point by analyzing the interrelationships
between leading indicators of various sorts of activities and the sub-
sequent impact of the indicators on aggregate economic activity, and
we will undertake some initial steps along this line in the following
section. Here, we consider simply the timing relationships among the
growth cycle chronologies for the ten countries under review.
According to Table 6—3 at peaks there was a clear tendency for
the United Kingdom and West Germany to lead and for France,
Italy, Sweden, and Japan to lag. Belgium and the Netherlands were as
likely to lead as to lag. The United States led at only three of the
seven recessions, although the earlier period shows close coincidence,
while the later peaks show leads. At troughs the dispersion is slightly
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Table 6—5.Leads and Lags of International Composite Indexes at their
Respective Growth Cycle Turning Points.
• L
of Lea
ead (—)orLag (#), in Months,
ding us. Coincident Index at G











































—3 —9 —2 —3 —12 0 —6
Notes:
a.United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and Italy.
b. Canada, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan.
c.United States, Canada, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, and
Japan.
d.n.m.=Nomatching turn.
recession more often (three times) than any other country. Japan
led twice. No other country led the world index up more than once.
Taking peaks and troughs together, we find that the individual coun-
try turns, based on the medians, occurred within three months of the
international turn for every country except France, Italy, Belgium,
and Sweden, all of which lag.'2
Another way of looking at the evidence is shown in Table 6-4,
which records the sequence in which the matching peaks and troughs
in the ten countries occurred. The first country to turn is given a
rank of one, the last a rank of ten. When a country is not available at
a given turn (designated by n.a.), the highest possible rank is reduced
by one. When two or more countries turn in the same month, a tie is
indicated by averaging the two rankings. Since no country attains a
rank of one at more than two of the seven peaks, it is clear that no
country can be said to lead invariably the other countries into reces-
sion. On the other hand, the United States has a rank of one at two
of the troughs, and is tied for first at two more, so that at four of
the six troughs the United States was one of the first countries to
turn. It is not unreasonable,therefore, to conclude that, according tor
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Table 6-5. continued
Lead (-)orLag (+),inMonths, AverageLead (—)or
of Leading vs. Coincident Index at Growth
Cycle Peaks and Troughs (continued)
Lag (+),in Months
Median Mean
P T PT P T P
5/70 2/727/74 8/75 12/76 10/7711/79 PT P&TP T P&T
—9 0 —2 —1+1 +4 —2 -20—2 —5 —2 —4
P T P
11/73 9/75 2/80
+3-7 0 0—7 -4-2 —6 -4
P T P T P
8/69 8/71 11/73 5/75 9/79
—4-9 —9-2 —6 -6-4 —6—7 -6 —6
the above data, the United States tends to lead other countries out
of recession. At peaks, however, the role of initiator shifts from
country to country, seemingly at random. This point has not gener.
ally been recognized.'3
LEADINGAND LAGGING INDICATORS
OF INTERNATIONAL CYCLE TURNS
Theprevious section described the validity and usefulness of an inter-
national growth cycle chronology (based on summary measures of
cyclical activity) and the construction of a composite index (based
on the roughly -coincident indicators for each country). An alterna-
tive approach is to relate turns in national leading or lagging indica-
tors to the international cycle chronology.
A comparison based on international composite indexes of all
leading and coincident indicators is given in Figure 6-1 and Table
6-5. The indexes in the table have been computed three ways: the
first including all seven countries in our "world composite indexes,"
the second excluding the United States, and the third limited to four
European countries. By omitting the U.S. data, the results are inde-
pendent of any of the U.S. information that was used to classify the
indicators as leading or lagging. As Figure 6—i shows, the leading
indexes trace out each of the cycles identified by the coincident
indexes, thus helping to confirm their validity. The table records theT
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timingof the cycles in the leading indexes vis-à-vis the coincident
indexes. As a rule, at each of the international growth cycle turns,
the leading index turns before the coincident index. There are very
few exceptions to this expected order—in the seven-country index,
the 1966 peak is the sole exception. For the six-country index, there
are four exceptions—three exact coincidences for the leading index
and one three-month lag. For the four-country index, there are five
exceptions—two are exact coincidences and three are lags. Thus, by
the strictest standards of expected behavior even the four-country
leading index leads the coincident index at two-thirds of the indi-
vidual turns.
When we examine whether one country seems to trigger the spread
of economic instability internationally, the behavior of the leading
indicators at international turns is clearly of considerable irnpor-
tance. Careful inspection of the leads shown in Table 6—6 for peaks
reveals a variety of outcomes. Not only is there diversity in the
length of the lead among countries at individual peaks, there is also
diversity within individual countries at different peaks. Moreover,
the length of the lead at peaks varies from peak to peak. There does
not seem to be any, firm rule, therefore, for the leading, coincident,
or lagging indicators of any country to lead the other countries into
recession. The situation is similar at troughs. No single country seems
regularly to act as bellwether in leading the industrial economies into
or out of recession.
The ordering of turns in the entire sequence from leading to lag-
ging indicators at the international cycle turning points does not
significantly alter our previous conclusion that instability is not cus-
tomarily set off by one particular country. The United States, Can-
ada, and the United Kingdom have usually been among the first,
while France, Italy, Belgium, and Sweden have usually been among
the last to participate in changes in the international cycle, both at
peaks and troughs, and for all three categories of indicators. In order
to understand which country will lead other countries into recession
or into recovery at any particular point in time, it is clearly essential
to examine specific economic developments for each nation. How-
ever, neither the economic situation in a particular country nor the
particular set of economic policies developed in any country has,
based on our evidence, resulted in its consistently turning first. The
picture is more complete if we include the timing of leaders and lag-
gers because our perspective on instability recognizes that one cycli-
cal phase tends to merge into the next. Our emphasis on growth
cycles rather than classical cycles has not produced any evidence sug-
gesting that this perspective should be changed.
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11. A different kind of test was applied to the duration of business cycle
expansions and contractions measured in months. The distribution of durations
was not significantly different from what would be expected in a series whose
first differences were randomly ordered in time (J. Huston Mc Culloch, "The
Monte Carlo Cycle in Business Activity," Journal of Economic Inquiry 13
(September 1975): 303-20). Tests were applied to the NBER business cycle
chronologies for the United States (1854-1970), France (1865-1938), Germany
(1879-1932), and Great Britain (1854-1938). A similar result for U.S. expan-
sions and contractions (1854-1957) was obtained by Arthur M. Okun, "On the
Appraisal of Cyclical Turning Point Predictors," Journal of Business of the Uni-
versity of Chicago 33, no. 2 (April 1960): 101-20. These results are not incon-
sistent with those for annual growth rates cited in the text, since growth rates
are obtained by differencing. The practical implication of these tests is that
knowledge of how long an expansion or contraction has already lasted is of little
use in predicting when it will end. See E. E. Anderson, "Further Evidence on the
Monte Carlo Cycle in Business Activity," Journal of Economic Inquiry 15, no. 2
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12. Ina recent study of U.S. growth cycle timing compared to the timing of
a number of Pacific Basin countries, we found that the United States generally
led at growth cycle turns for all the countries mrveyed except Taiwan. See
Philip A. Klein, "Forecasting Growth Cycles with Indicators in Pacific Basin
Countries," Columbia Journal of World Business (Fall 1983): 3-19. Another
recent study of synchronization in international business cycles is Cohn Law-
rence, "The Role of Information and the International Business Cycle," Journal
of International Economics 17 (1984): 101-120.
13. In this connection, P. A. Klein has compared matched turns of classical
cycle turning points for the United States and the United Kingdom for the
periods available (1854-1938) and concluded that U.S. turns were apt to lag
British turns (at both peaks and troughs) prior to World War IL For a compar.
able period (1879—1932), the average suggested a small lag for United States
turns behind German turns, both at peaks and troughs. However, this was the
result of a fairly long lag at both peaks and troughs in the earlier period (1879-
1914) and a fairly long lead in the period covering the interwar years. See Klein,
Business Cycles in the Postwar World: Some Reflections on Recent Research
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), Table 7, p. 30.
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